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NOTE

ALGORITHMIC ELECTIONS
Sarah M.L. Bender*
Artificial intelligence (AI) has entered election administration. Across the
country, election officials are beginning to use AI systems to purge voter records, verify mail-in ballots, and draw district lines. Already, these technologies
are having a profound effect on voting rights and democratic processes. However, they have received relatively little attention from AI experts, advocates,
and policymakers. Scholars have sounded the alarm on a variety of “algorithmic harms” resulting from AI’s use in the criminal justice system, employment,
healthcare, and other civil rights domains. Many of these same algorithmic
harms manifest in elections and voting but have been underexplored and remain unaddressed.
This Note offers three contributions. First, it documents the various forms of
“algorithmic decisionmaking” that are currently present in U.S. elections. This
is the most comprehensive survey of AI’s use in elections and voting to date.
Second, it explains how algorithmic harms resulting from these technologies
are disenfranchising eligible voters and disrupting democratic processes. Finally, it identifies several unique characteristics of the U.S. election administration system that are likely to complicate reform efforts and must be
addressed to safeguard voting rights.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the potential for algorithms to make voting easier and
elections fairer and more reliable has gained increased attention. Computer
scientists have developed algorithms to make redistricting less partisan, which
have been touted as a cure for gerrymandering. 1 Counties are using artificial
intelligence technologies (AIs) to perform mobile-only elections, allowing
voters to cast their ballots using a smartphone or other electronic device. 2 Others are piloting algorithmic tools that track voter data to ensure that no fraud
or significant administrative errors occur. 3
AI holds great promise. It can be used to automate a wide variety of processes and decisions that were previously performed by humans and are thus
susceptible to error and inefficiencies. And unlike humans, algorithms cannot

1. See, e.g., Jowei Chen & Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Race-Blind Future of Voting
Rights, 130 YALE L.J. 862, 866 (2021); Emily Rong Zhang, Bolstering Faith with Facts: Supporting
Independent Redistricting Commissions with Redistricting Algorithms, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 987
(2021); Daniel Oberhaus, Algorithms Supercharged Gerrymandering. We Should Use Them to Fix
It, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 3, 2017, 3:11 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/7xkmag/gerrymandering-algorithms [perma.cc/C84F-JC88]; Douglas Rudeen, The Balk Stops Here: Standards for the Justiciability of Gerrymandering in the Coming Age of Artificial Intelligence, 56 IDAHO
L. REV. 261, 277–78 (2020).
2. Mark Minevich, 7 Ways AI Could Solve All of Our Election Woes: Out with the Polls,
In with the AI Models, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2020, 8:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markminevich/2020/11/02/7-ways-ai-could-solve-all-of-our-election-woes-out-with-the-polls-inwith-the-ai-models/?sh=68252669622c [perma.cc/UJR9-6K26].
3. Whitney Clavin, Algorithms Seek Out Voter Fraud, CALTECH: NEWS (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.caltech.edu/about/news/algorithms-seek-out-voter-fraud [perma.cc/XL9K-2DCU].
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themselves engage in intentional discrimination. 4 As a result, they have the
potential to improve traditional human decisionmaking and to render more
objective and less discriminatory results. 5
Unfortunately, this hope has not borne out in practice. Algorithms have
instead proven to be “our opinions embedded in code.” 6 Indeed, “[m]ounting
evidence reveals that algorithmic decisions can produce biased, discriminatory, and unfair outcomes in a variety of high-stakes economic spheres including employment, credit, health care, and housing.”7 Prejudice can infect AIs
and algorithms in a variety of ways, causing them to compound existing injustices and yield discriminatory results. For example, AI-generated recidivism scores used in Florida were almost twice as likely to falsely label Black
defendants as future criminals, as compared to white defendants. 8
Extensive scholarship has documented how AI is being used in the criminal justice, housing, education, employment, financial services, and
healthcare domains, as well as the risks it poses to civil rights and civil liberties. 9 Relatively little attention has been given to its use in U.S. elections or its
impact on voting rights, 10 however. This Note seeks to further that conversation.
This Note has two primary target audiences. The first is AI experts, legal
scholars, policymakers, and advocates who are working to promote algorithmic accountability in other domains. I hope to persuade this group of the importance of addressing algorithmic harms in elections and voting—and to
provide them with an initial framework for doing so effectively. The second
target audience comprises public officials and voting rights advocates and experts who are working to improve our election systems but may be less familiar with AI. My goal is to provide this group with a workable understanding
of how AI may affect their work, as well as why such technology must be deployed cautiously.
Part I seeks to facilitate conversation between these two audiences by
providing a brief primer on the technical concepts discussed in this Note and
by relating the different types of “algorithmic harms” that scholars have identified in other domains that are relevant to elections and voting. Part II is the
4. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
5. See James Manyika, Jake Silberg & Brittany Presten, What Do We Do About the Biases
in AI?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/what-do-we-do-about-the-biases-in-ai [perma.cc/J72V-9LXC].
6. McKenzie Raub, Comment, Bots, Bias and Big Data: Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Bias and Disparate Impact Liability in Hiring Practices, 71 ARK. L. REV. 529, 533–34 (2018).
7. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Janice Kopec & Mohamad Batal, Algorithms and Economic
Justice: A Taxonomy of Harms and a Path Forward for the Federal Trade Commission, 23 YALE
J.L. & TECH. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 3 (2021).
8. Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy,
21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 157 (2019).
9. See infra Section I.B.
10. See infra note 11 (surveying scholarly literature on AI and elections).
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heart of the Note. It catalogs the different ways that election administrators
use AI to make decisions and manage elections, as well as the algorithmic
harms this may cause. This is the most comprehensive review of AI’s use in
elections and voting to date. 11 Finally, Part III identifies several unique characteristics of election administration in the United States and explains why
these characteristics may complicate efforts to address algorithmic harms in
this domain.
I.

ALGORITHMIC DECISIONMAKING AND ALGORITHMIC HARMS

Not all members of this Note’s target audiences are familiar with how AI
and algorithms work, and some of the terms used in this Note have been defined in different ways. This Part seeks to establish a baseline understanding
of how algorithmic decisionmaking 12 can produce inaccurate, biased, and unfair outcomes. Section I.A defines the key technical terms used throughout
this Note, as well as the scope of the technologies discussed in Part II. Section
I.B describes different types of “algorithmic harms” that are relevant to elections and summarizes existing literature on how such harms occur and manifest in other civil rights domains.

11. Though there is a growing body of literature about AI’s use in redistricting, these
pieces do not address other forms of algorithmic decisonmaking in election administration. See,
e.g., Zhang, supra note 1; Rudeen, supra note 1. Similarly, other scholarship has examined the
use of algorithmic technologies in voter roll maintenance or signature verification but does not
address some other uses of AI in these fields and/or makes no mention of AI’s use in redistricting. See, e.g., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS ABOUT ELECTRONIC
VOTING 47–49 (Richard Celeste, Dick Thornburgh & Herbert Lin eds., 2006) (describing the use
of name-matching algorithms in voter roll maintenance but not the interstate cross-checking
technologies described in Section II.A); ROXANA ARJON ET AL., STANFORD L. SCH., SIGNATURE
VERIFICATION AND MAIL BALLOTS 29 (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/SLS_Signature_Verification_Report-5-15-20-FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/XYN4-SQAJ]
(surveying the use of signature-matching AIs but not list-maintenance or redistricting AIs in
California); BRUCE YELLIN, DELL TECHS., CAN TECHNOLOGY RESHAPE AMERICA’S ELECTION
SYSTEM? (2021), https://education.dellemc.com/content/dam/dell-emc/documents/en-us/2021KS
_Yellin-Can_Technology_Reshape_Americas_Election_System.pdf [perma.cc/7R63-BEE6] (describing some of the ways AI is used in voter roll maintenance, signature matching, and election
interference but making no mention of redistricting technologies). A number of scholars and
journalists have also called attention to AI’s use in political advertising and election interference.
See, e.g., Elaine Kamarck, Malevolent Soft Power, AI, and the Threat to Democracy, BROOKINGS
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/malevolent-soft-power-ai-and-the-threatto-democracy [perma.cc/VN6D-D6FY]; Jeff Berkowitz, The Evolving Role of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in US Politics, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Dec. 21, 2020),
https://www.csis.org/blogs/technology-policy-blog/evolving-role-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-us-politics [perma.cc/FX6G-R846]. However, their works do not address how
election administrators are themselves leveraging AI to make decisions and manage elections.
12. This Note uses the term “algorithmic decisionmaking” to refer to any decisionmaking
or administrative process that has been automated by an algorithm or has otherwise been informed by an algorithmic system’s results.
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A. Key Technical Terms and Concepts
This Note uses a variety of terms to refer to the emerging technologies
revolutionizing election administration and other domains. These include “algorithms,” “artificial intelligence,” and “machine learning.” Some authors
have used the image of a Russian nesting doll to illustrate the relations between these terms—algorithms are the largest, outermost doll because, while
all AI uses algorithms, not all algorithms constitute AI. 13 Similarly, all machine learning involves AI, but not all AI involves machine learning. 14
Broadly speaking, an algorithm is “a finite series of well-defined, computer-implementable instructions”15 used to process input data and generate
certain outputs. 16 Today, nearly all software programs use some type of algorithm to solve problems and execute tasks. 17 Algorithms can be quite simple,
like generating a Fibonacci sequence. 18 They can also be quite complex, like
those that provide autonomous vehicles with driving instructions, identify abnormal X-rays and CT scans, or assign students to public schools. 19
Experts define AI in a variety of ways, but the term generally refers to
machines that mimic human intelligence. 20 AI systems use algorithms to analyze text, data, images, and other inputs and make decisions about them in a
way that is consistent with human decisionmaking. 21 AI’s “ability to extract
intelligence from unstructured data” is particularly impactful. 22 Vast amounts
of data are generated daily, which, on their face, have little apparent meaning. 23 The goal of AI is to make sense of such data, identifying new patterns
and determining how best to act upon them. 24

13. See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 7, at 2 n.1; Eda Kavlakoglu, AI vs. Machine Learning vs.
Deep Learning vs. Neural Networks: What’s the Difference?, IBM: BLOG (May 27, 2020), https://
www.ibm.com/cloud/blog/ai-vs-machine-learning-vs-deep-learning-vs-neural-networks [perma.
cc/VF6U-HN6F].
14. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 2 n.1.
15. Id.; The Definitive Glossary of Higher Mathematical Jargon, MATH VAULT, https://mathvault.ca/math-glossary/#algo [perma.cc/VQ78-7W63].
16. The Definitive Glossary of Higher Mathematical Jargon, supra note 15.
17. John R. Allen & Darrell M. West, The Brookings Glossary of AI and Emerging Technologies, BROOKINGS (Oct. 11, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/07/13/the
-brookings-glossary-of-ai-and-emerging-technologies [perma.cc/Z2WV-42MH].
18. E.g., Ali Dasdan, Twelve Simple Algorithms to Compute Fibonacci Numbers (Apr.
16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1803.07199.
19. Allen & West, supra note 17.
20. Kavlakoglu, supra note 13.
21. Darrell M. West, What Is Artificial Intelligence?, BROOKINGS (Oct. 4, 2018), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/what-is-artificial-intelligence [perma.cc/MGF3-TR9S].
22. Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 108.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Machine learning is a form of AI, which relies on algorithms that can
learn from data without rules-based programming. 25 These learning algorithms can “classify data, pictures, text, or objects without detailed instruction
and . . . learn in the process so that new pictures or objects can be accurately
identified based on that learned information.”26 Machine-learning technologies thus depend less on human programming and more on algorithms that
can learn from data as they progress, improving at tasks with experience. 27
Scientists “train” machine-learning algorithms to do particular tasks by
feeding the algorithm data for which the “target variable,” or outcome of interest, is known. 28 The algorithm derives from these data “complex statistical
models linking the input data with which it has been provided to predictions
about the target variable.” 29 For example, to train an algorithm to identify malignant tumors, scientists will show it a large number of tumor X-rays or scans
and indicate which are benign and which are cancerous. 30 The algorithm will
begin to pick up on patterns in the tumor images, allowing it to distinguish
between benign and malignant tumors in new images. 31 Thus, the data used
to train machine-learning algorithms—and the process by which scientists label the data—have a significant impact on the outcomes they generate. 32
B. How Algorithms Harm
Because AIs do not have any conscious awareness or intentions that are
independent from those embedded within their code, “most commentators
and courts believe that an AI cannot itself engage in intentional discrimination.” 33 Nevertheless, algorithmic decisionmaking can lead to a number of
harmful outcomes, which are well documented in other civil rights domains
and are likewise present in election administration. Faulty training and poor
design can cause algorithmic systems to render inaccurate and biased results.
But even well-designed AIs may be misused or may “proxy discriminate.” Finally, these technologies’ opacity and complexity can exacerbate each of these
issues by making them harder to identify and mitigate.

25. Allen & West, supra note 17.
26. Id.
27. Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 114; Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy
Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1273–
75 (2020).
28. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1273; Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Artificial Intelligence and Discrimination in Health Care, 19 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS,
no. 3, 2020, at 1, 8–9.
29. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1274.
30. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 28, at 9.
31. Id.
32. See Raub, supra note 6, at 533–34.
33. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1274.
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Faulty Programming and Design

Though AIs have a veneer of impartiality and accuracy, each of their technical components involves human judgment. Humans select the data used to
train algorithms, label these data sets, and design and program the logical
steps that the algorithmic system operationalizes. 34 Human error and bias can
infect AIs and algorithms at each of these stages, which can cause them to
render inaccurate and discriminatory results. 35 These results may then be used
to make high-stakes decisions, like how to allocate a limited supply of
COVID-19 vaccines 36 or whether to initiate a child welfare intervention. 37
“Faulty training data” is a common cause of this type of algorithmic harm.
As described above, the accuracy of a machine-learning algorithm is directly
linked to the quality of the data used to train it. 38 Training data can be skewed
in a variety of ways, all of which may impair the algorithm’s results and produce problematic outcomes. 39
First, training data may not represent the population they are designed to
serve, causing biased and ungeneralizable outcomes. 40 For example, Amazon
recently discontinued its use of a recruiting AI after it found the tool was systematically discriminating against female candidates. 41 The data used to train
the AI were sourced from resumes submitted to Amazon—where men comprise 60 percent of the workforce and 74 percent of managerial positions—
and benchmarked against the company’s engineers. 42 Despite the company’s
best efforts, the hiring system kept attempting to reproduce the training data’s
male-heavy pattern, even penalizing resumes that included the word
“women’s,” as well as the resumes of applicants who attended women’s colleges. 43
34. Deborah Won, Note, The Missing Algorithm: Safeguarding Brady Against the Rise of
Trade Secrecy in Policing, 120 MICH. L. REV. 157, 162 (2021).
35. Id.
36. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 4.
37. AI NOW, ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY TOOLKIT 7 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/aap-toolkit.pdf [perma.cc/FPP9-C7VT].
38. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text; Slaughter, supra note 7, at 7; Solon
Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 680–81 (2016).
39. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 7–8.
40. Id. at 14; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 38, at 684–87.
41. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 8; Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool
That Showed Bias Against Women, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2018, 7:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-%20scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G [perma.cc/6FE3-J59Q]; Nicol
Turner Lee, Paul Resnick & Genie Barton, Algorithmic Bias Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices and Policies to Reduce Consumer Harms, BROOKINGS (May 22, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-toreduce-consumer-harms [perma.cc/VK5X-CKA9].
42. Lee et al., supra note 41.
43. Id.
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Training data may also be incomplete or incorrect, which can cause the
AI to render inaccurate results. 44 For example, racial and ethnic minorities
and low-income individuals often have missing and incorrect information in
their medical records. 45 Thus, algorithms trained using medical records may
fail to identify significant variables and perform worse for such patients and,
generally, across the board. 46
However, even AIs trained on accurate and fully representative datasets
can yield unjust results. 47 Historic and systemic discrimination leaves some
people with “fewer skills, less wealth, poorer health and other traits that states,
employers, lenders or others are interested in.” 48 Even when data regarding
such traits are perfectly accurate, they will reflect the injustices that caused
such disparities. 49 For example, policymakers may allocate more funding to
schools in wealthy neighborhoods than to those in poor neighborhoods. If educational quality depends in part on such funds, then children in poor neighborhoods may fare worse on various metrics regarding educational
attainment and workforce preparation. 50 Data regarding such traits, however
accurate, will reflect these disparities. 51 In turn, AIs trained on such data may
learn to reinforce these historical patterns, rendering outcomes that disfavor
certain populations and compound these past injustices. 52
Programmers’ biases may also infect machine-learning algorithms
through “faulty labeling” of training data. Labels instruct algorithms how to
distinguish between certain inputs. 53 These labels are often objective (e.g.,
whether an item is red or blue), but they may also entail more subjective judgment calls, like what makes a good employee. 54 When one considers the severe
lack of diversity in the tech industry—which is “predominantly white, Asian,
and male” 55—it becomes easy to see how programmers’ biases can become
embedded in these technologies.

44. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 28, at 13.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 18; Deborah Hellman, Big Data and Compounding Injustice, 19 J. MORAL PHIL.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3840175 [perma.cc/GED6CWXJ].
48. Hellman, supra note 47, at 4.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Raub, supra note 6, at 534.
54. Id.; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 38, at 679.
55. Raub, supra note 6, at 541.
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Developers of AI systems may rely on faulty experimental design when
evaluating the accuracy of their systems. This may also cause algorithmic systems to render inaccurate or misleading results. 56 For example, developers of
“affect recognition” AIs claim they can detect personality and character traits
by analyzing body language, speech patterns, facial expressions, and other
mannerisms. 57 Though numerous studies have concluded that efforts to deduce individuals’ internal states based on their facial movements alone are “at
best incomplete and at worst entirely lack validity,” 58 companies continue to
sell these technologies and market them as reliable predictors of social outcomes like job performance. 59
2.

Faulty Uses

Even the most accurate and well-designed algorithmic technologies can
lead to harmful results through “faulty use.” Faulty use occurs when users misinterpret the outputs of algorithmic systems. 60 A common example is when
users place too much stock in the system’s results, a phenomenon commonly
referred to as “automation bias.” 61 Despite their imperfections, AI and algorithmic technologies are shrouded in a “veneer of objectivity.” 62 Humans tend
to view automated systems as fairer and more reliable than humans. 63 Coupled with our natural tendency “to seek out paths of least cognitive effort,
[and] to expend less energy when part of a team,” this often causes AI users to
overrely on and have too much confidence in these systems’ results. 64 The
risks of automation bias are greatest when AIs are marketed as producing reliable, objective results but are in fact infected with biases or other inaccuracies. 65 However, automation bias can cause users of even the most responsibly
designed AI to overgeneralize and excessively depend on its results. This can
have serious and even life-threatening consequences. 66

56. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 10, 13.
57. Id. at 11–12.
58. Lisa Feldman Barrett et al., Emotional Expressions Reconsidered: Challenges to Inferring Emotion from Human Facial Movements, 20 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT., no. 1, 2019, at 48.
59. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 12.
60. See Won, supra note 34, at 162.
61. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008);
see also Slaughter, supra note 7, at 13.
62. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 13.
63. See Jeffrey L. Vagle, Tightening the OODA Loop: Police Militarization, Race, and Algorithmic Surveillance, 22 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 128–30 (2016).
64. Id. at 128.
65. See Slaughter, supra note 7, at 13–14.
66. See Vagle, supra note 63, at 129–30; see also, e.g., M.L. Cummings, Automation Bias
in Intelligent Time Critical Decision Support Systems, in AIAA 1ST INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS
TECHNICAL CONFERENCE 5 (2004), https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2004-6313 (listing several examples of automation bias “in the ‘real world’ where the consequences were deadly”).
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Humans can also misuse AIs by feeding them “faulty inputs,” or input
data that are low in quality or discordant with the systems’ intended use. 67 For
example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, some hospitals hurriedly repurposed AI systems that were designed and trained for non-pandemic uses and
situations. 68 Though these AIs may perform the tasks for which they were designed well, repurposing them can create a mismatch between the training
data and input data, resulting in unreliable outputs. 69 Nevertheless, hospitals
have used these tools to handle highly sensitive pandemic-response tasks, like
forecasting whether an infected patient might need intensive care or a ventilator. 70
“Contextual bias” is a related form of faulty use. It “arises in the process
of translating algorithms from one context to another” (e.g., from a high-resource hospital like Memorial Sloan Kettering to a low-resource rural health
center). 71 While an AI trained in one setting may be untinged by problematic
bias when deployed in the same and similar contexts, 72 it may render biased
results in other contexts if it was not trained to account for such differences. 73
3.

Proxy Discrimination

Algorithmic systems may also “proxy discriminate.” Proxy discrimination occurs “when a facially-neutral trait is utilized as a stand-in—or proxy—
for a protected trait,” like race, sex, or disability status. 74 For example, Facebook “likes” and social media activity can accurately predict a wide range of
personal characteristics, including gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity,
religious beliefs, political views, relationship status, intelligence, use of addictive substances, and even the marital status of one’s parents. 75 Discriminators
can use these kinds of data in facially neutral ways, which nevertheless leads
to differing treatment of protected classes. 76 This can occur both intentionally
and inadvertently. 77 In either instance, the usefulness of the neutral practice

67. See Won, supra note 34, at 162.
68. DAVID LESLIE ET AL., DOES “AI” STAND FOR AUGMENTING INEQUALITY IN THE ERA
OF COVID-19 HEALTHCARE? 3 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n304.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. W. Nicholson Price II, Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 67–
68 (2019) (emphasis omitted).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1267.
75. Raub, supra note 6, at 535–36.
76. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1267; Slaughter, supra note 7, at 20.
77. Raub, supra note 6, at 536; Slaughter, supra note 7, at 23–24.
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“derives, at least in part, from the very fact that it produces a disparate impact”78 and “often result[s] in disparate treatment of or disparate impact on
protected classes for certain economic, social, and civic opportunities.” 79
Proxy discrimination demonstrates why prohibiting the inclusion of protected traits in AI models does little to mitigate algorithmic bias. For example,
an AI that prices life insurance policies may begin to charge more for individuals who are members of a Facebook group focused on increasing access to
testing for BRCA genetic variants, which are highly predictive of certain cancers. 80 Members of this group are likely to have a family connection to these
BRCA-related cancers and are thus more likely to be at risk themselves. 81
Thus, even if this AI explicitly excludes genetic information from its model to
comply with state law, 82 it could still use the Facebook data to proxy discriminate against individuals with certain genetic predispositions. 83
4.

Lack of Transparency

Transparency could help to mitigate concerns regarding algorithms’ accuracy and bias and encourage more responsible use of automated technologies. 84 However, many AI models are shrouded by trade secret protections.
These protections make it much more difficult to validate AIs’ results and to
assess their accuracy and fairness. 85
This issue manifests in the criminal justice space, where algorithmic technologies have been used to interpret DNA evidence, fingerprint matches, and
breathalyzer results in criminal convictions. 86 The private companies that develop these tools have claimed that their algorithms are proprietary and must
be kept secret to recoup their investments. 87 But, “[w]ithout access to the details of the computerized algorithms providing incriminating evidence against

78. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1257.
79. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 20.
80. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1261–62.
81. Id.
82. For example, Florida “has enacted a genetic privacy law that prohibits life insurance
companies from canceling, limiting or denying coverage and from setting different premium
rates based on genetic information.” Cameron Huddleston & Jason Metz, Can Life Insurance
Companies Get Your Genetic Test Results?, FORBES: ADVISOR (Oct. 28, 2022, 10:53 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/advisor/life-insurance/genetic-testing [perma.cc/23HS-GRQ2].
83. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1261–62.
84. Meghan J. Ryan, Secret Algorithms, IP Rights, and the Public Interest, 21 NEV. L.J. 61,
65 (2020).
85. See id. at 64.
86. Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal
Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1346–48, 1393–94 (2018); Won, supra note 34, at 165.
87. Ryan, supra note 84, at 64; see also Justin Jouvenal, A Secret Algorithm Is Transforming
DNA Evidence. This Defendant Could Be the First to Scrutinize It, WASH. POST (July 13, 2021,
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them, . . . defendants lack the opportunity to challenge this incriminating evidence that poses real questions of accuracy, not to mention bias.” 88
Even when AI models and algorithms are public, their reasoning processes are often impossible to understand. Many learning algorithms, such as
neural networks, constantly adapt their models to new inputs. 89 As a result,
AI programmers, users, and AIs themselves are often unable to explain how
or why these “black box” algorithms reached certain conclusions. 90 As one expert has explained, “[i]t is like asking a turtle why its species decided to grow
a shell. We know it was adaptive, but may not know the precise pathway taken
to reach its current state.” 91
This hidden decisionmaking not only makes it difficult to assess
whether and why an algorithmic system is inaccurate or biased but also complicates civil rights enforcement. Much of antidiscrimination law requires a
showing of intentional discrimination, not just disparate impact. 92 For example, the “requirement of purpose” doctrine “reads an intentionality requirement into the Equal Protection [C]lause,” meaning actions that cause
discriminatory results are only unconstitutional if the discrimination is intended. 93 However, because AIs “do not have any conscious awareness or objectives that are independent from those that are embedded within their code,”
most scholars agree that they cannot themselves engage in intentional discrimination. 94 The organizations and individuals who adopt and use AIs certainly can. But, in many of the civil rights domains in which algorithmic harms
have been examined, AIs are not adopted out of malice but rather to promote

8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/trueallele-software-dna-courts/
2021/07/12/66d27c44-6c9d-11eb-9f80-3d7646ce1bc0_story.html [perma.cc/SX3L-4PL3].
88. Ryan, supra note 84, at 65; see also Rebecca Wexler, Convicted by Code, SLATE (Oct. 6,
2015, 12:28 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2015/10/defendants-should-be-able-to-inspectsoftware-code-used-in-forensics.html [perma.cc/MHL9-E233].
89. See Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 153–54.
90. Id.; see also Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1304.
91. Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 154.
92. See id. at 152–53.
93. Id. at 153 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
94. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1274; see also Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 906 (2018).
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efficiency and cost savings. 95 As a result, algorithmic decisionmaking may be
beyond the reach of equal protection doctrine regardless of how biased it is. 96
II.

AUTOMATING ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Activists and experts have raised concerns about the use of AI to predict
where crimes are likely to occur. They likewise worry about the use of AI to
allocate police resources, 97 assess the risk of recidivism to determine sentencing, 98 and identify and find suspects using photos and videos. 99 Advocates
have also sounded the alarm on algorithmic bias in consumer lending, 100
housing, 101 education, 102 employment, 103 healthcare, 104 and the allocation of
government services and benefits. 105

95. See Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the
World, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-artificial-intelligence-is-transforming-the-world [perma.cc/K3PN-GPQX] (describing how AI is being used in
criminal justice, health care, and other domains with the goal of improving decisionmaking);
Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 28, at 31 (“Most if not all medical AI algorithm developers are
well-intentioned and strive in good faith to improve human health through their work.”); Shannen Balogh & Carter Johnson, AI Can Help Reduce Inequity in Credit Access, but Banks Will
Have to Trade Off Fairness for Accuracy—For Now, BUS. INSIDER (June 30, 2021, 9:30 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/ai-lending-risks-opportunities-credit-decisioning-data-inequity-2021-6 [perma.cc/PW7W-GPTV] (explaining how financial firms are turning to AI “to
make faster, more efficient credit decisions” and “more accurate predictions of [] consumers’
creditworthiness, regardless of factors like race and sex”).
96. Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 153; Bathaee, supra note 94, at 920–21.
97. ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING 73 (2017).
98. See, e.g., Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting
Recidivism, SCI. ADVANCES, Jan. 17, 2018, at 1.
99. See FERGUSON, supra note 97, at 35–40.
100. See, e.g., Aaron Klein, Reducing Bias in AI-Based Financial Services, BROOKINGS (July
10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/reducing-bias-in-ai-based-financial-services
[perma.cc/EF57-ANXW].
101. See, e.g., Lauren Sarkesian & Spandana Singh, HUD’s New Rule Paves the Way for Rampant Algorithmic Discrimination in Housing Decisions, NEW AM. (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.
newamerica.org/oti/blog/huds-new-rule-paves-the-way-for-rampant-algorithmic-discrimination
-in-housing-decisions [perma.cc/F8YU-3R3H].
102. See, e.g., Andre M. Perry & Nicol Turner Lee, AI Is Coming to Schools, and If We’re Not
Careful, So Will Its Biases, BROOKINGS (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2019/09/26/ai-is-coming-to-schools-and-if-were-not-careful-so-will-its-biases [perma.cc/
R5QX-5954].
103. See, e.g., Raub, supra note 6; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 38, at 684–87; Miranda
Bogen, All the Ways Hiring Algorithms Can Introduce Bias, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 6, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/05/all-the-ways-hiring-algorithms-can-introduce-bias [perma.cc/AW83
-ANG5].
104. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 28; Price, supra note 71.
105. See, e.g., AI NOW, supra note 37, at 7, 14.
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Relatively little attention has been paid to AI’s use in elections and its impact on voting rights. 106 Election officials have begun to leverage intelligent
computing technologies to streamline a variety of election administration activities, including voter roll maintenance, signature matching, and redistricting. 107 As in other domains, AI has the potential to make these processes more
efficient, equitable, and accessible. But these technologies also raise the same
aforementioned concerns 108 regarding accuracy, fairness, and transparency.
This Part provides the most comprehensive review to date of how algorithmic technologies are being used in U.S. election administration and the
risks they pose to voting rights and election integrity. Section II.A describes
the use of AI in voter roll maintenance, including voter purges. Section II.B
focuses on signature-matching AIs, which many states use to validate mail-in
ballots. Section II.C explores algorithmic technologies’ current and future impact on redistricting, including the effects of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rucho v. Common Cause. 109 Finally, Section II.D briefly describes
several AI developments that are related to elections and voting but fall outside of the election administration domain.
A. Maintaining Voter Rolls
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires states to create, for
use in federal elections, a “single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive
computerized statewide voter registration list,” containing registration information and identifying every registered voter in the state. 110 States cannot satisfy this requirement if their cities and counties maintain their own voter
registration systems; HAVA requires “a true statewide system that is both uniform in each local election jurisdiction and administered at the state level.” 111
After a voter registry is created, states must keep ineligible voters off the registration lists and add newly registered voters to them. 112
The practice of removing voters from these lists is commonly referred to
as “voter purging.” 113 Voters can lose their eligibility for a variety of reasons,
including changes in residence, felony convictions, mental incapacity findings, death, or inactivity. 114 List maintenance is important for both election

106. See, e.g., id. (reviewing recent scholarship on algorithmic accountability related to
healthcare, criminal justice, education, public benefits, and immigration but making no mention
of elections or voting).
107. See infra Sections II.A–C.
108. See supra Section I.B.
109. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
110. 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A).
111. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 46.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., id.
114. Id.
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integrity and efficiency; experts estimate that one in every eight registrations
is invalid, which can increase the risk of voter fraud and clog voter rolls. 115
However, voter purges are also prone to error. For example, in 2016, Arkansas removed from the state’s voter rolls more than 50,000 people who were
purportedly ineligible to vote because they had been convicted of a felony. 116
The purge list was extremely inaccurate: at least 4,000 people did not have a
disqualifying conviction, and up to 60 percent of those who did have disqualifying convictions were eligible to vote because their voting rights had been
restored. 117 These types of errors can “reduce confidence in the voting process,
exclude voters from certain forms of official election communication, and result in disenfranchisement if a citizen is removed and does not reregister before their state’s registration deadline.” 118 Voter purges can also be used to
manipulate election outcomes 119 and to discriminate against poor and minority voters. 120 Though the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) 121 set federal standards for voter purges in 1993, states continue to conduct illegal
purges and adopt policies that violate the NVRA. 122
Because voter registration lists generally contain millions of entries,
purges must be at least partially automated. 123 To achieve this, computers
compare voter registration lists with information from other sources, such as
death notices, felony conviction records, and recent address lists, to determine
who remains eligible. 124 This task can be even more complicated than it seems.
The same individual may be listed differently across various databases. For
example, “John Jones and John X. Jones may refer to the same person, and he
may have given the former name in registering to vote and the latter name in

115. Gregory A. Huber, Marc Meredith, Michael Morse & Katie Steele, The Racial Burden
of Voter List Maintenance Errors: Evidence from Wisconsin’s Supplemental Movers Poll Books,
SCI. ADVANCES, Feb. 17, 2021, at 1.
116. JONATHAN BRATER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. AT N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., VOTER PURGES:
THE RISKS IN 2018, at 1 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Voter_Purges_The_Risks_in_2018.pdf [perma.cc/Y9JV-5NUR].
117. Id.
118. Huber et al., supra note 115, at 1.
119. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 49.
120. See Sean Holstege, Do Voter Purges Discriminate Against the Poor and Minorities?,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2016, 12:07 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/do-voterpurges-discriminate-against-poor%20minorities-n636586 [perma.cc/AS5W-6639]. Relatedly,
purge rates have increased most in jurisdictions previously subject to federal preclearance requirements under the Voting Rights Act. JONATHAN BRATER, KEVIN MORRIS, MYRNA PÉREZ &
CHRISTOPHER DELUZIO, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. AT N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., PURGES: A GROWING
THREAT TO THE RIGHT TO VOTE 3 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/media/235/download [perma.cc/SB6U-B8TK].
121. 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511.
122. BRATER ET AL., supra note 120, at 1–2.
123. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 46.
124. Id.
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obtaining a driver’s license.” 125 The same name may also refer to many different people, or names may be misspelled. 126 Name-matching algorithms are
widely used to overcome these challenges. 127
It is particularly difficult to update voter lists when people move between
states. There is no central body in the United States to monitor when people
move from one state to another, and, in general, there is no requirement for
registered voters to cancel their registrations before moving. 128 As a result,
roughly 2.75 million Americans were on more than one state’s voter rolls as
of 2012. 129
Interstate cross-checking became feasible after states began to centralize,
standardize, and digitize their voter rolls in 2002 as part of HAVA. 130 Since
then, states have experimented with algorithmic decision systems to exchange
voter data. In 2005, the Kansas Secretary of State launched the Interstate Voter
Registration Crosscheck Program (“Crosscheck”), a data-matching system
that purported to root out voter fraud. 131 Crosscheck worked by comparing
states’ voter files and sending participating states a list of voter registrations
that matched those of another state. 132 Though states could use this information however they wished, Crosscheck provided guidelines for purging
these voters’ records. 133
Another interstate cross-checking initiative has since taken hold. A nonprofit organization called the Electronic Registration Information Center
(ERIC) uses algorithm processes 134 to assist thirty states and the District of
Columbia in identifying unregistered individuals and maintaining accurate
voter registries. 135 ERIC generates two types of lists for member states: (1) lists

125. Id. at 47.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 48.
128. Alexander Siegal, Voter Fraud’s False Advertisers: Partisanship and Preventing Another Kansas Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program, 1 N.Y.U. AM. PUB. POL’Y REV.
25, 25 (2021).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 26.
131. Id.
132. Id.; Christopher Ingraham, This Anti-Voter-Fraud Program Gets It Wrong over 99
Percent of the Time. The GOP Wants to Take It Nationwide., WASH. POST (July 20, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/20/this-anti-voter-fraud-program-gets-itwrong-over-99-of-the-time-the-gop-wants-to-take-it-nationwide [perma.cc/2W3G-UT74].
133. Ingraham, supra note 132.
134. See Huber et al., supra note 115, at 3 (describing ERIC’s system as an “algorithmic
process”); ELEC. REGISTRATION INFO. CTR., ERIC: TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY OVERVIEW 2–3
(2021), https://ericstates.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ERIC_Tech_and_Security_Brief_v5.
0.pdf [perma.cc/YLF7-5P6Y] (describing ERIC’s use of record linkage algorithms).
135. Huber et al., supra note 115, at 1; see also ELEC. REGISTRATION INFO. CTR., Ensuring
the Efficiency and Integrity of America’s Voter Rolls, https://ericstates.org [perma.cc/NVL9D5VZ].
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of residents who are likely to be eligible to vote but are not registered, and (2)
lists of registrants who may have moved, died, or have duplicate registrations. 136 Member states agree to contact the individuals on these lists, often
using a mailed postcard, to either encourage them to register or to confirm
that their registrations are accurate. 137
Though such algorithmic systems can help to streamline a cumbersome
and difficult administrative task, they pose a number of potential algorithmic
harms. First, they may render biased, inaccurate results, which can disenfranchise eligible voters. For example, at least one study has found that namematching algorithms’ accuracy varies among racial and ethnic groups. 138 Specifically, these tools rendered more “mismatches” for Asian names. 139
Similar concerns about accuracy and bias have been raised regarding interstate cross-checking systems. Crosscheck was suspended in 2019 as part of
a settlement with the ACLU of Kansas 140 after researchers found that the tool
was overrun with security flaws and false positives.141 For every duplicate registration that the tool accurately identified and eliminated, the tool incorrectly
flagged roughly 200 registrations that were used to cast legitimate votes. 142
These voter records were purged, jeopardizing these eligible voters’ ability to
cast a ballot. 143
ERIC has raised fewer civil rights concerns than Crosscheck and has even
enabled some member states to increase voter registration rates through outreach to individuals who are eligible to vote but not on their voter rolls. 144
However, because its lists are also used in states’ voter purges,145 it has the

136. Huber et al., supra note 115, at 2.
137. Id. at 1.
138. Alexandros Karakasidis & Evaggelia Pitoura, Identifying Bias in Name Matching
Tasks, in ADVANCES IN DATABASE TECHNOLOGY—EDBT 2019 (Melanie Herschel et al. eds.,
2019), https://openproceedings.org/2019/conf/edbt/EDBT19_paper_213.pdf [perma.cc/9WXT
-HA64].
139. Id.
140. ACLU of Kansas Settlement Puts “Crosscheck” Out of Commission for Foreseeable Future, ACLU OF KANSAS (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.aclukansas.org/en/press-releases/aclu-kansas-settlement-puts-crosscheck-out-commission-foreseeable-future-program [perma.cc/H8DMYSFS].
141. Moore v. Schwab (Previously Moore v. Kobach), ACLU OF KANSAS (June 19, 2018),
https://www.aclukansas.org/en/cases/moore-v-schwab-previously-moore-v-kobach [perma.cc/
LA8T-VW7A].
142. Sharad Goel et al., One Person, One Vote: Estimating the Prevalence of Double Voting
in U.S. Presidential Elections, 114 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 456, 466 (2020).
143. See id.
144. Huber et al., supra note 115, at 2; see also Steve Lohr, Another Use for A.I.: Finding
Millions of Unregistered Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/
technology/unregistered-voter-rolls.html [perma.cc/5PEH-WFGU].
145. Huber et al., supra note 115, at 1.

506

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 121:489

same capacity for voter disenfranchisement. 146 ERIC member states contact
voters who are flagged as having moved or no longer being eligible to vote. 147
But, as Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, “more often than not, the State fails to receive anything back from the
registrant.” 148 Individuals may fail to confirm their eligibility for a variety of
reasons, including recipients suspecting that the postcards sent by states to
confirm their registration are junk mail or a scam or simply never receiving
them. 149 Whatever the cause, individuals who fail to respond to states’ outreach may be purged from voter rolls, leaving them unable to vote in the next
election. 150
Despite ERIC’s impact on an important matter of public concern, there
has been little transparency regarding its processes and outcomes. As a result,
assessing its accuracy and potential discriminatory impact is difficult. Internal
evaluations of ERIC’s list-maintenance practices have not been publicly released, and independent external reviews have not occurred because ERIC’s
Membership Agreement prevents states from disclosing ERIC data to third
parties. 151 At least one study, however, has found that minority voters are
more likely to be incorrectly removed from voter files because of ERIC’s
lists. 152
Even a well-designed algorithmic system will yield inaccurate results if its
users input data that are unrelated to the system’s target variable. This type of
“faulty input” has fueled voter purges in the past. For example, election officials in some states used the federal government’s Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) database to compile voter purge lists. 153 But
SAVE was not designed for this purpose; it is meant to verify immigration
status to determine eligibility for public benefits and, thus, includes data concerning both citizens and noncitizens. 154 Still, some states relied on the SAVE
list as a way to verify the citizenship status of registered voters, eliminating the
records of those they concluded were noncitizens. 155 Using SAVE in this way
risked disenfranchising eligible voters, particularly those who had recently become naturalized citizens. 156 This practice was challenged, and, in 2014, the

146. See id. at 2.
147. Id.
148. 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1856 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Huber et al., supra note 115, at 2–3.
152. Id. at 7–8.
153. Fatma Marouf, The Hunt for Noncitizen Voters, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 66–67
(2012); Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 683–84 (2017).
154. Marouf, supra note 153, at 67; Hu, supra note 153, at 683–84.
155. Marouf, supra note 153, at 67–68.
156. Id. at 68; see also Hu, supra note 153, at 683–84.

December 2022]

Algorithmic Elections

507

Eleventh Circuit found it to violate the NVRA for this reason. 157 Nevertheless,
other faulty inputs could be used in the future.
Concerns about the accuracy and bias of voter purges are neither new nor
unique to algorithmic systems. Nevertheless, these systems merit special attention for several reasons. First is the risk of automation bias. Purge lists generated by algorithmic systems may appear more objective and accurate, and
thus may be subject to less scrutiny by election administrators, lawmakers,
and the general public.
Further, incorporating complex algorithms into the list-maintenance
process could make it harder to ensure that states and officials are complying
with the NVRA and other laws governing voter purges. Ensuring compliance
is difficult even with traditional forms of list maintenance. 158 AI will likely further complicate oversight and enforcement efforts by making these processes
even less transparent.
B. Signature Matching
A record number of voters cast their ballots by mail during the 2020 elections. 159 Before the vast majority of these votes were counted, they underwent
a signature-matching test. 160 As of 2020, thirty-three states required validation
of voters’ signatures on mail-in ballots. 161 In the 2016 elections, signature discrepancies were the most common reason for rejecting mail-in ballots, 162 and,
over the course of the 2016 and 2018 elections, more than 750,000 absentee
ballots were voided during the signature-matching process. 163
The signature-verification process varies dramatically between states and
even from county to county. 164 Election officials adhere to a wide variety of
rules and procedures and receive little, if any, training about how to identify
fraudulent signatures. 165 Whatever the process, signature verification can be

157.
158.
159.

Arcia v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2014).
See BRATER ET AL., supra note 120.
Sabri Ben-Achour, Robots Will Be Verifying Some of Our Ballots. Can We Trust Them?,
MARKETPLACE (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/vote-bymail-ballots-mismatched-signatures-verification-software-disenfranchisement [perma.cc/92M2338L].
160. Kyle Wiggers, Automatic Signature Verification Software Threatens to Disenfranchise
U.S. Voters, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 25, 2020, 10:25 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2020/10/25/automatic-signature-verification-software-threatens-to-disenfranchise-u-s-voters [perma.cc/E8J4UEHK].
161. Id.
162. Ben-Achour, supra note 159.
163. Wiggers, supra note 160.
164. David A. Graham, Signed, Sealed, Delivered—Then Discarded, ATLANTIC (Oct. 21,
2020, 5:47 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/signature-matching-is-thephrenology-of-elections/616790 [perma.cc/7TVF-GC7W].
165. Id.
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extremely burdensome for election officials who must deliver speedy results
with limited staff. 166
As a result, many jurisdictions have begun using AI to automate the signature-verification process. 167 At least twenty-nine counties in eight states, 168
all or most of which are in the top hundred largest counties by registered voters, 169 use signature-matching software. This software uses machine learning
to compare signatures found on mail-in ballots with those in voters’ files. 170
Algorithms evaluate certain features of these signatures, like their width,
height, symmetry, and stroke directions to identify points of similarity. 171 If
the signature clears a fixed “confidence threshold,” the ballot is marked as verified; if not, it is flagged as a possible mismatch. 172
Though jurisdictions use a variety of machines to process mail-in ballots, 173 most counties use the same signature-matching software created by
Parascript. 174 The similarities end there. Counties leverage this software in
dramatically different ways. First, jurisdictions have different rules about what
comparison signatures the algorithms can use to verify the ballot. Most allow
the software to access all of the signatures in voter files, including those from
departments of motor vehicles (DMVs). 175 However, other counties restrict
the machines to use only voters’ original voter registration signatures. 176
Second, officials can set different confidence thresholds for verifying signatures. 177 As a result, ballots with the same number of points of similarity
could be approved in one jurisdiction but flagged as a mismatch in another.
This can dramatically affect ballot approval rates. 178
Third, jurisdictions have different procedures for how they use the software’s results. In many jurisdictions, ballots flagged as a possible mismatch

166. Paresh Dave & Andy Sullivan, Factbox: U.S. Counties Using Automated Signature Verification Software, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2020, 7:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaelection-ballot-signatures-softwa/factbox-u-s-counties-using-automated-signature-verificationsoftware-idUSKCN26F1U4 [perma.cc/SSH8-Y5YP].
167. E.g., Ben-Achour, supra note 159; Wiggers, supra note 160; Dave & Sullivan, supra
note 166; YELLIN, supra note 11, at 17–18.
168. Ben-Achour, supra note 159.
169. Dave & Sullivan, supra note 166.
170. Parascript Solutions for Election Systems, PARASCRIPT, https://www.parascript.com/solutions-by-industry/government/vote-by-mail-signature-verification [perma.cc/NY4E-Z33V];
see also Ben-Achour, supra note 159; ARJON ET AL., supra note 11, at 1.
171. Wiggers, supra note 160; ARJON ET AL., supra note 11, at 26–29.
172. ARJON ET AL., supra note 11, at 29.
173. Id. at 30.
174. Dave & Sullivan, supra note 166; Wiggers, supra note 160.
175. Ben-Achour, supra note 159.
176. ARJON ET AL., supra note 11, at 23.
177. Wiggers, supra note 160.
178. Id.
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are manually examined by staff, while those the AI approves are not. 179 Other
counties require staff to verify each ballot, regardless of the AI’s results. 180
Many experts worry that these signature-matching AIs are flagging the
wrong ballots, with marginalized voters bearing the brunt of such errors.
Though studies have reached conflicting conclusions regarding these programs’ accuracy, some estimate that it could be as low as 74 percent. 181
“Faulty training data” is one cause of these tools’ inaccuracies. These algorithms are trained on unrepresentative datasets and thus may continue to
disadvantage certain groups of voters. 182 For example, existing signaturematching software programs are often trained only on English handwriting. 183
As a result, voters who do not write in English may be at a greater risk of having their ballot rejected. 184
Because manual signature matching processes are also highly inaccurate
and tend to disfavor certain groups of voters, similar disparities could result if
AIs are trained on historical datasets. As previously noted, election officials
who verify signatures receive little to no training, increasing the likelihood
that they will flag a genuine signature as a fake. 185 Further, studies have repeatedly found that young voters, 186 elderly voters, 187 voters with disabilities, 188
voters of color, 189 and first-time mail-in voters 190 experience higher rejection
rates. Those who have changed their name are also at a disadvantage, meaning
that “married women, trans people, or domestic abuse survivors [are] disproportionately likely to have their vote cast out.” 191
“Faulty inputs” may also be to blame. These technologies are often used
to compare ballots, which are signed by hand on paper, with those collected

179. ARJON ET AL., supra note 11, at 23.
180. Id.
181. Wiggers, supra note 160.
182. Ben-Achour, supra note 159.
183. Wiggers, supra note 160.
184. Id.
185. Maya Lau & Laura J. Nelson, ‘Ripe for Error’: Ballot Signature Verification Is Flawed—
And a Big Factor in the Election, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2020, 5:27 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-10-28/2020-election-voter-signature-verification [perma.cc/2YJF-268M].
186. See id.; Graham, supra note 164.
187. Lau & Nelson, supra note 185; Graham, supra note 164; see also Lila Carpenter, Signature Match Laws Disproportionately Impact Voters Already on the Margins, ACLU (Nov. 2,
2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/voting-rights/signature-match-laws-disproportionately-impact-voters-already-margins [perma.cc/3GNG-Y3U5].
188. Carpenter, supra note 187; Lau & Nelson, supra note 185; Graham, supra note 164.
189. See Lau & Nelson, supra note 185; Wiggers, supra note 160.
190. Lau & Nelson, supra note 185; Graham, supra note 164.
191. Wiggers, supra note 160; see also Carpenter, supra note 187.
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on electronic signature pads at DMVs. 192 These electronic pads tend to produce low-quality images of voters’ signatures. 193 People also move their hands
differently when signing on an electronic pad, 194 and, because they do not
know that their DMV signatures could be used to verify future ballots, may
not put much care into those signatures. 195 As a result, the signatures on which
these software programs rely often look like “scribble,” 196 which can contribute to the software’s inaccuracies.
Whatever the cause, these inaccuracies often result in eligible voters’ disenfranchisement. Only eighteen states require officials to notify voters when
signature mismatches cause their ballots to be rejected. 197 But even in these
states, many voters are left unaware that their signatures and ballots were rejected, and thus are left disenfranchised. 198
Despite these technologies’ potentially harmful impact on voting rights,
the algorithms upon which they rely are often not available for public use or
verification. 199 Their use is also largely unregulated. Federal and state laws that
regulate the use of electronic voting systems do not extend to automated scanners, like those used to verify voter signatures. 200 Though the U.S. Election Assistance Commission has said that “software should be set only to accept
nearly perfect signature matches and that humans should double-check a
sample,” it has not provided states with concrete guidance on acceptable error
rates or sample sizes, nor does it require signature-matching software vendors
to publish their error rates. 201
C. Redistricting
Algorithmic systems have already upended how redistricting and gerrymandering occur. 202 While historical efforts relied on guesswork, today’s
mapmakers have access to expansive yet highly granular voter data sets and
advanced data analytics. 203 When taken together, redistricting software can

192. Ben-Achour, supra note 159.
193. ARJON ET AL., supra note 11, at 30.
194. See Ben-Achour, supra note 159.
195. ARJON ET AL., supra note 11, at 30.
196. Id.
197. Ben-Achour, supra note 159.
198. Wiggers, supra note 160; Ben-Achour, supra note 159.
199. Wiggers, supra note 160.
200. ARJON ET AL., supra note 11, at 29.
201. Wiggers, supra note 160.
202. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2512–13 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(providing a brief history of partisan gerrymandering in the United States).
203. Id.; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Political Science Professors in Support of Appellees
and Affirmance at 20–22, Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (No. 18-422) [hereinafter Political Science Professors Brief].
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generate tens of thousands of hypothetical district maps and precisely forecast
how each would affect either political party’s electoral chances. 204
Experts have raised concerns about these technologies, which they argue
are imbued with partisan bias. 205 However, the Supreme Court has set few
limits on their use (or on partisan and racial gerrymandering more
broadly). 206 The Court had the opportunity to address the redistricting software’s use in Rucho v. Common Cause but instead held that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable 207 and left the issue to state courts and
legislatures. 208
This decision has paved the way for even more sophisticated technologies,
like AI, to infect redistricting processes. 209 Though much attention has been
given to AI’s potential to make redistricting less partisan, 210 it is also “uniquely
suited to perpetrate gerrymanders in ways that computer systems would not
have been able to during the 2010 redistricting cycle.” 211 Machine-learning
technologies outperform current redistricting tools, which still struggle to
capture nonlinear and context-dependent voting behavior. 212 In contrast, AI
tools can identify new patterns and predictive variables, 213 allowing mapmakers to predict voting behavior at the individual level and create maps that are
heavily gerrymandered but technically comply with existing legal standards. 214
The improved predictive power provided by AI tools has the ability to bolster
other statistical techniques. For example, a redistricting technique called
“matched-slice” gerrymandering uses individualized voting patterns to identify an opposing party’s most reliable voters and then draw maps that will neutralize them. 215 Though this technology was not yet ready to be deployed in
past redistricting cycles, it is expected to be used in the near future. 216
There is also a clear risk of “proxy discrimination” in this domain. Even
AIs that lack specific data about voters’ party registration or race can “search

204. Louise Matsakis, Big Data Supercharged Gerrymandering. It Could Help Stop It Too,
WIRED (June 28, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/big-data-supercharged-gerrymandering-supreme-court [perma.cc/JE96-DKZT]; Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
205. Political Science Professors Brief, supra note 203, at 23–25.
206. Rudeen, supra note 1, at 262.
207. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–07.
208. Rudeen, supra note 1, at 273.
209. Id.
210. E.g., Oberhaus, supra note 1; Chen & Stephanopoulos, supra note 1, at 866.
211. Rudeen, supra note 1, at 261.
212. See Political Science Professors Brief, supra note 203, at 20–21.
213. Id. at 25–28.
214. Rudeen, supra note 1, at 272; see also Political Science Professors Brief, supra note 203,
at 25–28.
215. Political Science Professors Brief, supra note 203, at 28–30.
216. See id.
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out latent or discrete statistical characteristics among groups of likely voters
that would correlate with them voting for a particular party, or [are] suggestive of their belonging to given racial groups.” 217 Though federal law more
clearly prohibits racial gerrymandering, guidance on the issue remains
murky. 218 Further, partisanship and race are closely connected in many parts
of the country, 219 making racial and partisan gerrymanders “increasingly difficult to tease apart.” 220 Thus, mapmakers could always claim that their motivations—and the AI’s goals—were purely partisan, not racial, and thus
nonjusticiable under Rucho.
Though this type of proxy discrimination is not a new problem, 221 AI amplifies the risk in several ways. First, AIs may proxy discriminate accidentally. 222 If membership in a protected class is correlated with a neutral
target variable, an AI trained to seek out this target variable may, inadvertently, end up favoring or disfavoring members of that group. 223
AI may also make it harder to rectify instances of proxy discrimination. 224
Because of the “obscur[ed] visibility into both the inputs and the formulae
used to make . . . decisions,” AI may make it harder to determine when such
bias is occurring. 225 Even where human actors are deploying AIs that proxy
discriminate intentionally, the opacity of these technologies may conceal their
biased decisionmaking, shielding them from accountability and oversight. 226
This can increase such tools’ “appearance of impartiality” and thus also the
risk of automation bias. 227
D. Other Potentially Impactful AI Developments
There are other uses of AI which, while related to elections and voting, do
not directly affect how election administrators manage and make decisions

217. Rudeen, supra note 1, at 275.
218. Id. at 273.
219. Kristen Clarke & Jon Greenbaum, Gerrymandering Symposium: The Racial Implications of Yesterday’s Partisan Gerrymandering Decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019, 2:01 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/gerrymandering-symposium-the-racial-implications-oftodays-partisan-gerrymandering-decision [perma.cc/G3WJ-LQSL].
220. Rudeen, supra note 1, at 262.
221. Slaughter, supra note 7, at 23 (“[T]he use of facially neutral factors that generate discriminatory results is something that society and civil rights laws have been grappling with for
decades.”).
222. Id.; Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1262–64, 1270–76.
223. See Slaughter, supra note 7, at 23; Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 1262–64, 1270–
76.
224. See Slaughter, supra note 7, at 23.
225. Id. at 22–23.
226. Id. at 23.
227. Id. at 22.
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about elections. This Note will not explore these in depth. However, a few
merit brief mention.
1.

Political Advertising

First, AI is dramatically reshaping advertising, including political advertising. Emerging AI technologies can use data “to design, in the moment, the
digital material most likely to lead consumers to engage in actions desired by
the [advertiser].”228 Take, for example, a Facebook ad, which typically consists
of different human-created components, like text, graphics, and hyperlinks. 229
Current technologies can already analyze user data to predict which mix of
such elements will be most compelling to a particular individual at a given
time. 230 AIs can go even further, “generating their own content and potentially
creating digital business materials without a single component that was directly designed by a human.” 231 By incorporating granular personal details
about each “data subject,” they can microtarget individuals and more effectively influence them. 232 These tools are not just less expensive than humangenerated advertising content but may also be more effective. 233
2.

Disinformation Campaigns

These social media AIs may also be deployed as a means of election interference. During the 2016 election, for instance, Russian actors conducted a
highly adaptive disinformation campaign in an effort to shape the political
narrative. 234 Through the use of AI, they generated millions of pieces of fake
news on Twitter, targeting different groups of voters. 235 This type of social
media activity can have a significant impact on voter behavior 236 and has been

228. Lauren E. Willis, Deception by Design, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 115, 130 (2020).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 131.
232. Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 138.
233. Willis, supra note 228, at 131.
234. Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 134–37.
235. Id. at 137–44.
236. See Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335 (2014) (describing a 2010 experiment on “digital gerrymandering” that found that users were more likely
to turn out—in electorally significant numbers—when shown news that their friends had voted);
Paul Lewis, ‘Fiction Is Outperforming Reality’: How YouTube’s Algorithm Distorts Truth,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/02/howyoutubes-algorithm-distorts-truth [perma.cc/XXY3-A6GP]; Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could
Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering [perma.cc/3QPB-N3N2].
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used to encourage minority voters to abstain from voting or vote for a thirdparty candidate. 237
“Deepfake” audio, images, and videos could make these disinformation
campaigns even more disruptive. 238 Deepfakes appear to depict individuals’
real words and actions but are actually fabrications made with facial recognition AIs. 239 As deepfakes become more convincing, these manipulations could
create particularly dangerous forms of “fake news” and could be used in the
days and hours preceding an election to sow confusion and distrust. For example, in 2021, Russia was accused of using deepfakes to trick senior officials
in the European Union and gain information on a Russian opposition movement. 240 In addition to imitating public officials, deepfakes could also be used
to create fake public testimony and influence or disrupt election proceedings. 241 For example, states that rely on independent redistricting commissions often allow citizens to testify about how they would like maps to be
drawn. 242 Fraudulent testimonies have been used in the past and will only become more convincing as these technologies advance. 243
3.

Election Hacking

AI also amplifies the risk of election hacking. Since the 2000 presidential
election, which sowed distrust in paper ballots, 244 most states and jurisdictions
have embraced electronic voting in some shape or form. 245 Electronic voting
technologies vary widely by jurisdiction and rely on a wide range of algorithmic and processing tools. These machines can make voting easier and allow
votes to be counted more quickly, accurately, and inexpensively. 246
However, there is reason to worry that the algorithms used in these technologies could be hacked to change electoral outcomes or steal confidential
election information. 247 Experts have raised concerns about voting machines’

237. Kamarck, supra note 11.
238. Alex Engler, Fighting Deepfakes When Detection Fails, BROOKINGS (Nov. 14, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/fighting-deepfakes-when-detection-fails [perma.cc/GTE5USXT].
239. Id.
240. Tony Ho Tran, Russia Accused of Using Deepfakes to Imitate Political Rivals,
FUTURISM: THE BYTE (Apr. 25, 2021), https://futurism.com/the-byte/russia-accused-usingdeepfakes-imitate-political-rivals [perma.cc/ZA3K-YXW5].
241. Rudeen, supra note 1, at 276.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 277; Engler, supra note 238; see also Kamarck, supra note 11.
244. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1724–34 (2005).
245. Ryan, supra note 84, at 96.
246. Id. at 96–97.
247. Id. at 99–100.
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susceptibility to outside manipulation for decades. 248 Not only were these machines “not initially designed with robust security in mind,” but many of these
machines’ components are manufactured abroad, creating additional security
risks. 249 As one expert explained, “[o]nce you’re in the chips, . . . you can hack
whole classes of machines, nationwide.” 250 These machines’ manufacturers
have vehemently denied these security risks, and some experts have argued
that the United States’ decentralized election administration system would
make such attacks difficult to conduct on a large scale. 251 But others contend
that the coding on these machines is “quite centralized—‘[o]ne large vendor
codes the system for 2,000 jurisdictions across 31 states’ . . . making sabotage
a real possibility.” 252 Plus, some machines are installed with remote-access
software, which may allow them to be remotely hacked. 253
AI can also help hackers overcome barriers to widespread election hacking. 254 By using algorithms to analyze vast amounts of data and automate certain processes, hackers can target election systems and overcome cyber
defenses more quickly and effectively. 255
Voter roll maintenance, ballot verification, and redistricting are being
transformed by algorithmic technologies. AI’s ability to improve the efficiency, accessibility, and fairness of these processes merits repeating. However, these technologies also present many of the same algorithmic harms
identified in other civil rights domains, which are already having a profound
effect on voting rights and our democratic processes.
III. OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO PROGRESS AND REFORM
Election administrators must take action to mitigate the risk of algorithmic harm. But, as Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter of the Federal Trade
Commission put it recently, “we must remember that just as [AI] is not magic,
neither is any cure to its shortcomings. It will take focused collaboration between policymakers, regulators, technologists, and attorneys to proactively
address this technology’s harms while harnessing its promise.” 256
This Part seeks to highlight for these stakeholders two unique characteristics of election administration that are likely to complicate reform efforts.
The first, described in Section III.A, is the political nature of these activities,

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 99; see also Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 136.
Ryan, supra note 84, at 99, 102.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id.
Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 136.
Id.
Slaughter, supra note 7, at 6.
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which may affect how election administrators use algorithmic decision systems. The second, described in Section III.B, is the decentralized and disuniform nature of election administration in the United States. Finally, in Section
III.C, I explain why proposed solutions may inadequately protect voting rights
because of these factors and offer several key considerations for future reforms.
A. Politics and the “Good Faith” Assumption
Much of the literature regarding algorithmic harms focus on harms that
occur accidentally. 257 This makes sense. In domains like healthcare, housing,
education, employment, financial services, criminal justice, and government
administration, AI tools are usually deployed in “good faith,” or in the interest
of improving efficiency, cost savings, and accuracy. 258 Though AIs deployed
in service of such goals may still generate inaccurate and discriminatory results, these outcomes are generally rendered inadvertently. 259 The concern is
less that AI users and developers may discriminate intentionally or act with
malice and more that their human error and implicit biases will infect algorithmic processes and cause systems to render harmful and biased results. 260
The same cannot necessarily be said with regard to election administration. Though many election officials are motivated by the same “good faith”
interests, their work cannot be separated from the broader political context. 261
Each of the election administration activities described in Part II can be and
have been used as political weapons. 262 Voter purges can be ordered for political reasons and intentionally conducted in ways that target or favor certain
voting blocs. 263 Redistricting has similarly been used to “put a thumb on the
scale” in favor of a particular political party. 264 Signature matching, too, has

257. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 28; Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 27;
Price, supra note 71.
258. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 28, at 31 (“Most if not all medical AI algorithm developers are well-intentioned and strive in good faith to improve human health through
their work.”).
259. See supra Section I.B.
260. See supra Section I.B.
261. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 49, 63.
262. See, e.g., id.
263. Id.
264. Julia Kirschenbaum & Michael Li, Gerrymandering Explained, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/gerrymandering-explained [perma.cc/2R47-KW7S].

December 2022]

Algorithmic Elections

517

become increasingly politicized and a heated point of contention in recent
elections. 265
Further, many election administrators are themselves partisan actors.266
Most secretaries of state, who generally serve as chief state election officials,
are elected in partisan contests. 267 Thus, they tend to be “ambitious political
operators.” 268 About half of all local election officials 269 and poll workers in
many states 270 are also openly aligned with a political party.
Even nonpartisan election administrators are subject to outside political
pressures. This may come from other public officials, the state legislature, or
even their constituents. For example, a nonpartisan election administrator resigned from her position last year after coming under “fierce attacks” from
partisan activists and county commissioners for her handling of the 2020 election. 271 She is not alone. In several states, party leaders have censured and replaced officials for resisting efforts to delegitimize the 2020 election results. 272
And, in recent months, a number of state legislatures have also proposed legislation to “politicize, criminalize, and interfere in election administration.”273
While election administrators may resist these pressures and deploy AIs
in good faith, these political forces are likely to infect the incentives surrounding these technologies’ use in some shape or form. Particularly in light of the
increased political polarization in the United States, it seems reasonable to
conclude that at least some of these systems are—or will be—used or designed
not only to improve efficiency but also to advance political ends.

265. See, e.g., Salvador Rizzo, Trump’s Latest Falsehood: Democrats Are Trying to End Signature Verification for Ballots, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/11/trumps-latest-falsehood-democrats-are-trying-end-signatureverification-ballots [perma.cc/D2G3-JZSW].
266. Miles Parks, Partisan Election Officials Are ‘Inherently Unfair’ but Probably Here to
Stay, NPR (Nov. 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/29/671524134/partisan-election-officials-are-inherently-unfair-but-probably-here-to-stay [perma.cc/BN7L-TZAJ].
267. KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45549, THE STATE AND LOCAL ROLE IN
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 12–13 (2019).
268. Siegal, supra note 128, at 26.
269. Parks, supra note 266.
270. See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, STATE-BY-STATE COMPENDIUM: ELECTION
WORKER LAWS & STATUTES (4th ed. 2020), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/pollworkers/Compendium_2020.pdf [perma.cc/H7SY-HPCQ].
271. Michele Carew, Partisan Attacks Drove Me Out of My Job as a Texas Elections Official,
WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/11/01/
partisan-attacks-drove-me-out-my-job-texas-elections-official [perma.cc/MXB3-PZWZ].
272. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. AT N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., ELECTION OFFICIALS UNDER ATTACK
(2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/BCJ-130_Election%20Officials
_fact%20sheet.pdf [perma.cc/Q3FD-RV9Y].
273. STATES UNITED DEMOCRACY CTR., PROTECT DEMOCRACY & LAW FORWARD,
MEMORANDUM: DEMOCRACY CRISIS REPORT UPDATE (2021), https://statesuniteddemocracy.org/
wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Democracy-Crisis-Part-II_June-10_Final_v7.pdf [perma.cc/98RCR4SP].
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B. Decentralization and Disuniformity
Election administration in the United States is also highly decentralized
and disuniform. 274 Elections are run by “thousands of state and local systems
rather than a single, unified national system.”275 States are typically responsible for determining the rules of elections, while local entities administer elections in accordance with those rules. 276 In some small jurisdictions, a single
person may be responsible for administrative activities from registering voters
to counting ballots. 277
There is also wide variation “in the way voting is run state to state, or even
within the same state.” 278 State and local election officials may be elected or
appointed, and either process may occur in a partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan manner. 279 Further, state officials have varying levels of influence over
local election officials. 280 The population size, density, and demographics of
the jurisdictions that each system serves can also vary significantly. 281
Though this decentralization, at least in theory, enhances election officials’ ability to experiment with new technologies and methodologies, some
experts believe it has slowed technological innovation in this domain. 282 The
current structure of election administration makes it difficult to create standardized voting systems. 283 As a result, there is no central national market for
election administration technologies and business solutions. 284 In this way,
our decentralized system may actually stymie the adoption of election AIs.
Decentralization and disuniformity may increase the risk of algorithmic
harm in other ways, however. First, it may afford election officials too much
deference in how they use these technologies. 285 As is the case with the signature-matching software discussed in Section II.B, this deference means that

274. See SHANTON, supra note 267, at 1.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 3, 7; Linda So, Factbox: Who Runs America’s Elections?, REUTERS (June 11,
2021, 6:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/who-runs-americas-elections-2021-0611 [perma.cc/SE3L-YFTJ].
277. So, supra note 276.
278. Id.
279. SHANTON, supra note 267, at ii.
280. Id. at 15.
281. Id. at 16–17.
282. See, e.g., Administering Elections in a Hyper-Partisan Era, MIT POL. SCI. (Oct. 21, 2021),
https://polisci.mit.edu/news/2021/administering-elections-hyper-partisan-era [perma.cc/3LHMZXY2].
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Cf. Joshua A. Douglas, Undue Deference to States in the 2020 Election Litigation, 30
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 59, 60 (2021) (arguing that courts have “too readily deferred to state
legislatures and election officials on how to administer elections, allowing infringements on the
constitutional right to vote without sufficient justification”).
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jurisdictions may deploy the same technologies in vastly different ways. In an
effort to achieve even greater efficiency, election officials may even repurpose
an AI or use “faulty input data,” increasing the risk of inaccurate results. This,
when combined with a lack of transparency, may make oversight efforts more
difficult. 286 Depending on how it is used, the same AI system may render accurate results in one jurisdiction but lead to gross algorithmic harms in another. 287
Deference to state and local election authorities can also pave the way for
suppressive and discriminatory practices. This has been one of the greatest
disadvantages of our decentralized election system historically. 288 The relatively low levels of federal oversight have allowed “anti-democratic pockets of
America . . . to suppress voting, sometimes brutally.” 289 The same is true with
algorithmic decisionmaking. Deference in whether and how to deploy these
tools is afforded not only to “good faith” election administrators but also to
those who look to achieve an illicit political end. 290
Because the populations that election systems serve can vary so significantly, decentralization may also increase the risk of algorithmic harms resulting from “contextual bias.” 291 Though the training data used to develop
election AIs may accurately reflect the demographics of certain localities, or
even the United States at large, they may be wholly unrepresentative of other
cities or states in which they are deployed. As a result, they may render inaccurate or biased results in certain settings.
Decentralization can also frustrate federal actions on election administration. 292 Federal laws’ efficacy depends “on how closely states and localities
comply with them,” which is likewise “affected by the duties and structures of
the state and local election systems that implement them.” 293 Failure to understand these structures has caused unintended effects from some federal election requirements. For example, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) holds states responsible for some of its requirements, such as transmitting absentee ballots to eligible uniformed services and other overseas citizens at least forty-five days before Election Day. 294
However, compliance with these requirements is often handled by local officials. 295 As a result, the officials held accountable for UOCAVA violations are

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See Ryan, supra note 84, at 65.
See Price, supra note 71, at 67–68.
Stewart, supra note 282.
Id.
See infra Section III.A.
See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
See SHANTON, supra note 267, at 18.
Id.
52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8).
SHANTON, supra note 267, at 18.
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often different from those who more directly failed to comply. 296 For example,
in 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the State of
Alabama for violating UOCAVA. 297 In its response, the state explained that
local officials were responsible for transmitting absentee ballots and, because
these local officials were popularly elected and not subject to removal by state
officials, it had limited control over whether or how they complied. 298
C. Finding a Path Forward
To date, the United States has been slow to respond to the threats posed
by AI. 299 In general, “[t]here is little oversight of AI development, leaving technology giants free to roam through our data and undermine our rights at
will.” 300
However, AI experts and legal scholars have proffered a variety of possible
solutions to the civil rights issues raised by algorithmic decision systems. Some
have put together “algorithmic bias toolkits” to help AI users assess and mitigate such risks. 301 Others have focused on improving diversity in the technology workforce302 and increasing representation in big data. 303 Some point to
intellectual property law as a key area for reform, arguing that this could mitigate the effects of the “algorithm secrecy problem.” 304 And some have proposed creating a regulatory body, analogous to the Food and Drug
Administration, to proactively regulate algorithms before they enter the market. 305
Though such reforms could be useful first steps, they are unlikely, standing alone, to adequately address the challenges algorithmic decisionmaking
presents in election administration. The efficacy of each of these reforms relies
on the “good faith” assumption described above, and thus, they would fail to
address the ways algorithmic systems might be designed or used to secure partisan or other advantage.

296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 110.
300. Id.
301. E.g., ZIAD OBERMEYER ET AL., CTR. FOR APPLIED A.I. AT CHI. BOOTH, ALGORITHMIC
BIAS PLAYBOOK (2021), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/project/chicago-booth/centers/
caai/docs/algorithmic-bias-playbook-june-2021.pdf [perma.cc/B2J5-KCK4]; AI NOW, supra note
37.
302. Manheim & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 160.
303. See id.; see also Kayte Spector-Bagdady et al., Respecting Autonomy and Enabling Diversity: The Effect of Eligibility and Enrollment on Research Data Demographics, 40 HEALTH AFFS.
1892 (2021).
304. Ryan, supra note 84, at 110; see also Raub, supra note 6, at 550.
305. See, e.g., Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 90 (2017).
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These proposed reforms are also largely focused on algorithmic harms resulting from faulty programming and design and inadequately address the
wide variety of ways that election administrators may use these technologies
and their results. Even accurate, responsibly designed AIs can be deployed in
ways that yield discriminatory results. 306 As a result, oversight that simply determines which algorithmic systems are fit for use will fail to address the full
range of algorithmic harms.
To adequately safeguard voting rights, regulators must address “faulty
uses” of AI and both intentional and unintentional “proxy discrimination.”
To do so, oversight must be ongoing, and regulators must monitor how these
technologies and their results are actually being used to make election decisions. For example, regulators could require election systems that use AI to
collect data about subjects’ membership in protected classes. 307 Those data
could then be used to assess whether the technologies are yielding discriminatory outcomes, either intentionally or inadvertently. 308
To be sure, such data might not be sufficient to establish a successful claim
under seemingly applicable federal antidiscrimination law. For instance, using
AIs that render racially biased results to conduct voter purges might run afoul
of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which prohibits electoral practices that result in a “denial or abridgment” of the right to vote based on race
or membership in a protected language minority group. 309 And yet, plaintiffs
have long struggled to prevail on related section 2 claims. 310 Recent decisions
limiting the statute’s application in these contexts, most notably in Brnovich
v. Democratic National Committee, 311 suggest the road ahead will be even
more difficult. 312 Parsing precisely how plaintiffs bringing AI-based section 2
claims might navigate the new “guideposts” 313 articulated in Brnovich is beyond the scope of this Note. What is clear is that these factors are likely to
diminish plaintiffs’ success in all section 2 cases 314 and to pose additional barriers for those challenging algorithmic decisionmaking.
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313. These guideposts include: (1) “the size of the burden imposed by a challenged voting
rule”; (2) “the degree to which a voting rule departs from what was standard practice when [section 2] was amended in 1982”; (3) “[t]he size of any disparities in a rule’s impact on members of
different racial or ethnic groups”; (4) “the opportunities provided by a State’s entire system of
voting”; and (5) “the strength of the state interests served” by the challenged voting rule. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2336, 2338–41.
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This Note is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of possible solutions to these challenges but rather to provide an initial framework for evaluating proposed reforms. Protecting voting rights and our democratic
processes from algorithmic harms requires careful consideration of both the
diverse election processes and systems in which these technologies are deployed, as well as the political pressures that plague them. In order to mitigate
the risks posed by AI and algorithmic decisionmaking, while also seizing their
many benefits, policymakers and advocates must account for the unique characteristics of election administration and voting rights law.
CONCLUSION
AI has entered our election administration, just as it has entered our
healthcare institutions, our criminal justice system, and our hiring practices.
Civil rights advocates, lawmakers, and legal scholars are right to sound the
alarm on algorithmic harms in these and other domains. However, they
should not neglect the impact of algorithmic decisionmaking on elections and
voting. Each of the election administration activities described in this Note
plays a significant role in our elections and democratic processes. They are
also being transformed by AI. Election administrators and lawmakers must
take thoughtful action to protect U.S. elections and voters from algorithmic
harms while retaining the promise of these new tools.

